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Abstract—We present models that utilize smart contracts and
interledger mechanisms to provide decentralized authorization
for constrained IoT devices. The models involve different trade-
offs in terms of cost, delay, complexity, and privacy, while exploit-
ing key advantages of smart contracts and multiple blockchains
that communicate with interledger mechanisms. These include
immutably recording hashes of authorization information and
policies in smart contracts, resilience through the execution of
smart contract code on all blockchain nodes, and cryptograph-
ically linking transactions and IoT events recorded on different
blockchains using hash and time-lock mechanisms. The proposed
models are evaluated on the public Ethereum testnets Rinkeby
and Ropsten, in terms of execution cost (gas), delay, and reduction
of data that needs to be sent to the constrained IoT devices.
Index Terms—decentralized authorization, interledger, hashed
time-lock contracts, constrained IoT environments
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchains have different properties, e.g., Ethereum is a
public and permissionless blockchain with Turing-complete
smart contracts and an intrinsic cryptocurrency. Being pub-
lic, Ethereum, as Bitcoin, provides large-scale decentralized
trust at the expense of high computation costs, hence high
transaction fees, and high transaction delays. On the other
hand, permissioned blockchains or distributed ledgers such as
Hyperledger Fabric and R3 Corda operate with a restricted set
of peers and incur a smaller cost and delay, while supporting
different levels of write and read access. Combining multi-
ple blockchains to implement different functionality, such as
authorization and payment, allows different cost, delay, com-
plexity, and privacy tradeoffs. However, multiple blockchains
or distributed ledgers must be interconnected in a way that
securely binds the transactions on different ledgers.
Authorization for constrained IoT devices (Things), with
limited connectivity and computation power, requires support
from an authorization server (AS) [1]; relevant use cases range
from authorization for home door locks and health monitoring
devices to smart container tracking and industrial actuator
control [2]. Offloading authorization functionality from IoT
devices to an AS also facilitates the collective management
of authorization policies. However, providing authorization
through a single AS is vulnerable to server failures and mis-
behavior. The goal of this paper is to propose and investigate
This research has been undertaken in the context of project SOFIE (Secure
Open Federation for Internet Everywhere), which has received funding from
EU’s Horizon 2020 programme, under grant agreement No. 779984.
models for providing decentralized authorization with multiple
ASes that utilize two blockchains, one for authorization and
the other for payments, in order to reduce the transaction cost
and delay compared to a single (public) blockchain.
The proposed models are general and can exploit blockchain
and smart contract technology in the context of authorization
in constrained IoT environments. Our realization of the models
considers the OAuth 2.0 delegated authorization framework,
which is based on access tokens and is a widely used IETF
standard, currently being investigated for authorization in IoT
environments by IETF’s Authentication and Authorization for
Constrained Environments (ACE) Working Group [3]. We also
consider the CBOR (Concise Binary Object Representation)
Web Token (CWT) format [3], [4], a recently proposed stan-
dard for compactly encoding claims in access tokens which is
more efficient than the JSON Web Token (JWT) format.
The contributions of the paper are the following:
• We investigate interledger mechanisms for securely link-
ing transactions on two blockchains, to reduce the execu-
tion cost and delay compared to a single (public) chain.
• We propose an approach for decentralized authorization
in constrained IoT environments that utilizes multiple au-
thorization servers (ASes) and includes two mechanisms
for reducing the amount of data that needs to be sent to
the constrained IoT devices (Things).
• We evaluate the proposed models on two public Ethereum
testnets, Rinkeby and Ropsten, in terms of execution cost
(gas), delay, and reduction of the amount of data that
needs to be sent to IoT devices.
Previous work on decentralized authorization based on smart
contracts assumes that IoT devices communicate with the
blockchain or are capable of executing public/private key
cryptographic functions. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first work to investigate the application of smart contracts
and multiple blockchains with interledger mechanisms for
decentralized authorization to constrained IoT devices.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In
Section II we present some background on authorization in
constrained IoT environments. In Section III we present the
proposed models for decentralized authorization and in Sec-
tion IV we evaluate the models. Finally, in Sections V and VI
we present related work and future research, respectively.
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II. AUTHORIZATION IN CONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENTS
OAuth 2.0 is a framework for delegated authorization to
access a protected resource [5]. It enables a third party
application (client) to obtain access with specific permissions
to a protected resource, with the consent of the resource
owner. Access to the resource is achieved through access
tokens, which are created by an authorization server (AS).
The specific format of the access tokens, which are discussed
below, is opaque to the clients and to OAuth 2.0. The consent
for authorization by the resource owner is provided after the
owner is authenticated. Authorization is provided for different
levels of access, which are termed scopes, and for a specific
time interval. The OAuth 2.0 authorization flows can involve
intermediate messages exchanged before the access token is
provided by the AS. However, the details of the authorization
flow does not impact the general approach of the proposed
models, hence in our discussion we only consider the initial
client request and the AS’s response with the access token.
One type of access tokens are bearer tokens. Bearer tokens
allow the holder (bearer), independently of its identity, to
access the protected resource. Bearer tokens are the default
for OAuth 2.0, which assumes secure communication between
the different entities using TLS (Transport Layer Security).
OAuth 2.0 also assumes that the protected resource is always
connected to the Internet, hence can communicate with the AS
to check the validity and scope of the access tokens presented
by the clients. Meeting the above two requirements is not
always possible in constrained environments [2].
JSON Web Token (JWT) is an open standard that defines
a compact format for transmitting claims as JSON objects
[6]. JWTs can use the JSON Web Signature (JWS) structure
to digitally sign or integrity protect claims with a Message
Authentication Code (MAC) [7]. Hence, unlike bearer tokens,
JWT/JWS tokens are self-contained, i.e., they include all the
information for the resource to verify their integrity without
communicating with the AS. The JWT format is considered by
the W3C Credentials Community Group for Verifiable Creden-
tials, which can be combined with Decentralized Identifiers or
DIDs [8]. A more efficient encoding derived from JWTs but
based on CBOR (Concise Binary Object Representation) is the
CBOR Web Token (CWT) [3], [4], which can be extended to
create and process signatures, MACs, and encrypted data [9].
In constrained environments, in addition to limited connec-
tivity, the communication between the client and the protected
resource is not secure, hence transmitting bearer tokens or self-
contained JWTs/CWTs over such insecure links make them
a target for eavesdropping. To avoid this Proof-of-Possession
(PoP) tokens are used [3]. PoP tokens include a normal access
token, such as a JWT/CWT, and a PoP key: access to the
protected resource requires both the access token and the
PoP key, which is used to secure the link between the client
and the IoT device. The implementation of the decentralized
authorization models presented in this paper adopts the CWT
format, proposing two schemes to further reduce the amount
of data that needs to be transmitted to the constrained device.
III. BLOCKCHAIN-BASED AUTHORIZATION
The advantages from combining authorization based on
frameworks such as OAuth 2.0 with blockchain and smart
contracts are the following:
• Blockchains can immutably record hashes of the infor-
mation exchanged during authorization and cryptograph-
ically link authorization grants to payments and other IoT
events recorded on the blockchain. These records serve
as indisputable receipts in the case of disagreements.
• Smart contracts can encode authorization policies in an
immutable and transparent manner. Policies can depend
on payments as well as other IoT events that are recorded
on the same or on different blockchains.
• Smart contracts run on all nodes of a blockchain. Hence,
sending resource access requests to smart contracts can
protect against DoS attacks that involve a very high
resource request rate, since requests are not handled by
one node, which would be a single point of failure.
We present four models that allow different tradeoffs in terms
of cost, delay, complexity, and privacy:
• Linking authorization grants to blockchain payments
• Smart contract handling authorization requests
• Smart contract and two blockchains for authorization and
payment with interledger mechanisms
• Decentralized authorization with multiple ASes
The first two models correspond to our baseline scenarios:
in the first, only hashes of authorization information are
immutably recorded on the blockchain and smart contracts are
not used, whereas the second model utilizes a smart contract
but on a single (public) blockchain. The third model, which
focuses on our first contribution, exploits two blockchains
whose transactions are securely linked using interledger mech-
anisms and quantifies the significant cost reduction that can be
achieved by moving smart contract authorization functionality
to a permissioned or private blockchain. The fourth model
focuses on both key contributions of the paper: decentral-
ized authorization for constrained IoT devices utilizing two
blockchains with interledger mechanisms.
A hash-lock is a cryptographic lock that can be unlocked
by revealing a secret whose hash is equal to the lock’s value
h. Unlocking a hash-lock can be one of the conditions for
performing a transaction or for executing a smart contract
function. On a single blockchain, a hash-lock can be linked to
an off-chain capability, e.g., message decryption, if the hash-
lock secret is the secret key that can decrypt the message.
Hash-locks can be used on two or more blockchains that
support the same hash function, to link a transaction on one
chain to a transaction on the other chain: if the two transactions
have hash-locks with the same value, then unlocking one hash-
lock would reveal the secret that unlocks the other; hence,
the two transactions are cryptographically linked through a
dependence relation. More generally, hash-locks combined
with AND/OR logic operators can implement elaborate de-
pendencies involving transactions on multiple chains.
Time-locks are blockchain locks that can be unlocked only
after an interval has elapsed. This interval can be measured in
absolute time or in the number of blocks mined after a specific
block. One usage of time-locks are refunds: a user (payer)
can make a deposit to a smart contract address. The smart
contract can have a function, which typically also includes a
hash-lock, for a second user to transfer the deposit to another
account (the payee’s account). However, if the second user
never calls this function, then the first user’s deposit could be
locked indefinitely in the smart contract’s account. To avoid
this, the smart contract can also include a refund function that
allows the first user to transfer the amount he/she deposited
back to the his/her account; however, this function can be
called only after some time interval, which is the interval in
which the second user must transfer the deposit from the smart
contract account to the payee’s account.
Contracts that include both hash and time-locks are referred
to as hashed time-lock contracts (HTLCs) [10]. HTLCs have
been used for atomic cross-chain trading (atomic swaps) [11],
[12] and for off-chain transactions between trustless parties
[13]. HTLCs can be implemented in blockchains with simple
scripting capabilities, such as the Bitcoin blockchain, with-
out requiring the advanced functionality of smart contracts.
Smart contracts do not increase the capabilities of interledger
mechanisms based on hash and time-locks, but increase the
intra-ledger functionality. We investigate these features for
decentralized authorization to constrained IoT devices.
In all the models presented below, the client sends a resource
access request to the URL of the AS (model 1) or to the
address of the smart contract responsible for handling access
to the IoT device (models 2, 3, and 4). The URL or smart
contract address can be obtained by the client sending a query
to the IoT device or reading a QR code on it. However,
this approach cannot ensure that the legitimate URL or smart
contract address is provided by the IoT device. This can be
ensured if the client uses a registry service that resides on the
blockchain and contains a binding between the IoT device’s
URI and the URL of the AS or the smart contract address
handling authorization, or by including this information in
Decentralized Identifier (DID) documents [14].
Finally, in all models we assume that the client, the resource
owner, and the ASes have an account (public/private key pair)
on the blockchain (both the authorization and the payment
blockchains for models 3 and 4).
A. Model #1: Linking authorization grants to payments and
recording authorization information on the blockchain
With this model the initial communication between the
client and the authorization server (AS) follows the normal
authorization message exchange, such as OAuth 2.0, Figure 1.
Specifically, in step 1 the client requests resource access from
the AS. The AS generates a random PoP key which it sends
to the client1 together with its encryption with the secret
1The communication link between the client and the AS is secured, hence
the PoP key cannot be obtained through eavesdropping.
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No modifications to 
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h=Hash(s)
Fig. 1. Model 1: Authorization grants are linked to blockchain payments and
the hashes of the authorization information exchanged are recorded on the
blockchain for verification in the case of disputes.
key2 KThing shared by the Thing (IoT device) and the AS;
the client will later use the PoP key to establish a secure
communication link with the Thing. Also, the AS sends to
the client the access token encrypted with a secret s, i.e.,
Es(token), the hash h = Hash(s) of the secret s, and the
price for the requested level of resource access. The secret
s is a secret randomly generated by the AS and is required
for the client to decrypt Es(token) and obtain the access
token; the AS will reveal the secret s once it confirms that
the payment for resource access has been committed on the
blockchain. Communicating the price from the AS to the
client allows different levels of resource access, encoded in
the access token’s scopes, to correspond to different prices.
In step 3, two hashes are submitted to the blockchain: the
first is the hash of the token that the AS will reveal to the client
once payment has been confirmed. The second is the hash
of three items: EKThing (PoP ), the PoP key, and Es(token);
the second hash serves as proof of the information that is
communicated using OAuth between the AS and the client.
Note that the above authorization exchange does not ensure
that the access token the client obtains from the AS indeed
allows access to the Thing.
Also in step 3 a hashed time-lock payment is initiated on the
blockchain, which allows the client to deposit an amount equal
to the requested price (step 4). This amount will be transferred
to the resource owner’s account if the secret s (hash-lock) is
submitted to the contract by the AS (step 5) within some time
interval. If the time interval is exceeded, then the client can
request a refund of the amount it deposited. Once the secret
s is revealed, the client can get s from the blockchain (step
6) and decrypt Es(token), and thus obtain the access token.
At this point, the client has all the necessary information to
request access from the Thing, using normal OAuth 2.0 with
the modifications from the ACE framework.
B. Model #2: Smart contract handling authorization requests
In the second model a smart contract is used to transparently
record prices and other authorization policies defined by the
2The secret key that the Thing and AS share is established during the
provisioning (or commissioning) phase, when the Thing is bound to the AS.
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Fig. 2. Model 3: Smart contract and two chains with interledger mechanisms.
resource owner, which is also the owner of the smart contract.
Examples of such policies include permitting resource access
to specific clients, determined by their public/private key pairs
on the blockchain, and adding dependence of access authoriza-
tion on IoT events that are recorded on the blockchain.
Whereas in the previous model the client and the AS
interacted directly, in this model the interaction is through
the smart contract; this is similar to the next model shown in
Figure 2, but using a single blockchain for both authorization
and payment. The smart contract code is executed by all
blockchain nodes, providing a secure and reliable execution
environment; this provides higher protection against DoS at-
tacks, compared to the model in Section III-A where resource
access requests are sent directly to the AS.
C. Model #3: Smart contract and two blockchains with in-
terledger mechanisms
In the model of this subsection the smart contract handling
authorization requests and encoding policies is located on
an authorization blockchain, while payments for resource
access are performed on a payment blockchain, see Figure 2.
Depending on whether the authorization chain is a public
or a permissioned blockchain, different tradeoffs between
transaction cost, delay, and privacy can be realized.
A hashed time-lock payment is initiated on the payment
blockchain, where the client can deposit an amount corre-
sponding to the resource access price. The amount will be
transferred to the resource owner’s account if the secret s
is revealed. Once revealed, the secret s can be submitted
to the smart contract on the authorization blockchain, which
serves as a record on this blockchain that the payment was
successfully performed. The client can obtain the secret s from
the authorization blockchain together with the other necessary
authorization information to access the protected resource.
One issue with the above model is how the payment contract
on the payment chain is triggered by the resource owner smart
contract residing on the authorization chain. One alternative is
to have an interledger gateway read the price and hash h from
the authorization chain and submit it to the payment chain to
initiate a payment (Step 4 in Figure 2), and later read the secret
s submitted by the AS on the payment blockchain and record it
on the authorization chain (Step 7); the interledger gateway can
receive a fee for performing this function. Another alternative
is to have this function performed by the AS or the client.
D. Model #4: Decentralized authorization with multiple ASes
The authorization functionality cannot all be moved onto
the blockchain, since it involves processing secret information:
keys to produce token signatures and keys shared with the
Thing. Performing the authorization functions redundantly in
the nodes of a private blockchain would provide a higher
level of resilience to node failures compared to a single AS,
but results in reduced security since compromising a single
blockchain node would lead to secret keys being disclosed.
Rather than moving all the authorization functionality to
the blockchain, we propose an alternative approach for decen-
tralized authorization that ensures security and provides fault
tolerance if some number of ASes are faulty or misbehave.
Let n be the number of ASes that are collectively responsible
for providing authorization. Each AS i shares a different secret
key, KThingi , with the protected resource (Thing). Authorized
access to the Thing requires tokens from m out of n servers.
The policy specifying the required number of ASes is defined
in the smart contract and is also known to the Thing. Fault
tolerance is provided by having n ASes which can respond
to requests, but requiring only m < n for authorization
to proceed. Compared to having a single AS, the proposed
scheme provides higher security since m ASes need to agree
in order for the client to access the protected resource.
There are two alternatives for how m servers are selected
to provide authorization. With the first, the smart contract
selects the specific m servers; this requires that the smart
contract maintains a list of ASes. The list can be updated
with information such as the time each AS last responded to
an authorization request. Such information allows the smart
contract to prioritize ASes in order to select those that respond
quickly, hence avoid ASes that have a high delay or are faulty3.
The evaluation in Section IV considers the first alternative.
With the second alternative, the smart contract simply
allows all ASes to respond to the authorization request, and
selects the first m ASes that respond. With this approach the
smart contract does not need to maintain the list of ASes. How-
ever, there is a possibility that the smart contract receives more
than m responses. This depends on the duration for mining a
block on the blockchain (in the case of public blockchains with
Proof-of-Work consensus) or for obtaining consensus to add
it to the blockchain (in the case of permissioned blockchains).
In public blockchains, these responses can incur a gas cost
independent of whether the ASes that gave the response were
among the m ASes to provide decentralized authorization.
In response to the client’s authorization request, each AS
sends a different PoP key PoPi, encrypted with the Thing’s
secret key and the client’s public key, and an access token
3Detection of misbehaving ASes that generate incorrect tokens is also
possible, but not discussed further due to limited space.
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Fig. 3. Model 4: Decentralized authorization: Each authorization grant
requires m out of n AS responses.
with a MAC tag to ensure its integrity (Figure 3). The client
thus obtains m different PoP keys, which it XORs to obtain
the secret PoP key that will be used to establish a secure
communication link with the Thing. These m PoP keys,
encrypted with the Thing’s key KThingi that it shares with
each of the m ASes, are also sent to the Thing. Hence, if the
Thing performs the same XOR function on the m PoP keys
it will obtain the same PoP key as the client.
Recall from the discussion in Section II that a requirement
is to reduce the amount of data transmitted to constrained
devices. We propose two schemes for reducing the autho-
rization information the client sends to the Thing: aggregate
MAC tags and transmission of common token fields once.
With aggregate MAC tags [15], the client sends to the Thing
the token payloads received from the m ASes, but only one
aggregate MAC tag that is computed by taking the XOR
of the m MAC tags the client receives from the m ASes.
With the second optimization, the client sends the token fields
that are common to all ASes only once (these correspond to
token′1, . . . token
′
m in Figure 2). The common token fields
include the subject (Thing) the token refers to, the scope of
access, the token creation time, the token validity time, and
the token type. The fields which are different include the AS
and token id fields. The reduction of the amount of data the
client sends to the Thing will be evaluated in the next section.
IV. EVALUATION
For the evaluation we deployed a local node running Go-
Ethereum connected to the Rinkeby public Ethereum testnet4
and a node running Parity connected to the Ropsten testnet5.
The AS was based on a PHP implementation of the OAuth
2.0 framework6, extended to support CWT’s CBOR encoding7.
The client used Web3.js to interact with the blockchain.
4https://www.rinkeby.io/
5https://ropsten.etherscan.io/
6https://github.com/bshaffer/oauth2-server-php
7https://github.com/2tvenom/CBOREncode
TABLE I
EXECUTION COST (GAS) AND DELAY - RINKEBY
Model Gas Delay in secs (s)
(95% conf. int.)
Hashes of auth. inform.-Fig. 1 102 489 43,2 (42,3, 44.1)
SC & 1 BC 258 166 59.3 (57.6, 61.1)
SC & 2 BCs-Fig. 2 85 682 43.0 (39.8, 46.2)
Dec-Auth 2-of-4 & 1 BC 1 440 540 60.5 (54.4, 67.3)
Dec-Auth 2-of-4 & 2 BCs-Fig. 3 332 569 42.1 (39.4, 44.8)
Dec-Auth 3-of-4 & 1 BC 2 124 249 63.7 (57.2, 70.2)
Dec-Auth 3-of-4 & 2 BCs-Fig. 3 447 940 44.7 (39.6, 49.9)
In Table I, the smart contract & one blockchain and the
decentralized & one blockchain models are equivalent to
Figure 2 (smart contract & two blockchains) and Figure 3
(decentralized authorization & two blockchains) with one
blockchain for both authorization and payment. For the results
with two blockchains, we use the public blockchain (Rinkeby
or Ropsten) as the payment chain and a private Ethereum
network as the authorization chain. The results shown include
the gas and delay due to transactions on the public blockchain
only. The results would be similar if we used another technol-
ogy, e.g., Hyperledger Fabric, as the authorization chain.
a) Gas: The second column in Table I shows that the
execution cost of a smart contract on the Ethereum Virtual
Machine (gas) on the public Rinkeby testnet is significantly
higher compared to simply recording hashes (first line in
Table I). However, when the smart contract authorization
functionality is moved to a private blockchain (models with
2 BCs in Table I), then the execution cost is significantly
reduced: For 1, 2, and 3 ASes the execution cost when two
blockchains are used is 33.2%, 23.1%, and 21.1% of the
execution cost when a single blockchain is used.
b) Delay: The delay is due mainly to the block mining
time. The smart contract model with one blockchain has
four transactions, while the model that records only hashes
has three; hence, the delay for the smart contract model is
expected to be 33% higher; this agrees with the results in
the third column of Table I, according to which the smart
contract model with one blockchain has average delay 59.3s,
which is 37.3% higher than the delay when only hashes are
recorded, 43.2s (also shown is the confidence interval from
20 runs). Table I quantifies the reduced delay when a public
chain is combined with a private chain: e.g., the 2 out of 4
decentralized model with two chains has average delay 42.1s,
which is 30.4% smaller than the delay with one chain, 60.5s.
Table I also shows that for both one and two blockchains, the
average delay is not significantly influenced by the number of
ASes. Also, for two blockchains the average delay is close to
the delay when only hashes are recorded.
Table II shows that the delays and confidence intervals for
the Ropsten testnet are higher than the Rinkeby testnet. We
attribute this difference to the fact that Rinkeby uses the Proof-
of-Authority (PoA) for distributed consensus, while Ropsten
uses Proof-of-Work, as the Ethereum mainnet. For both the
Rinkeby and Ropsten testnets, the delay depends on the gas
price that is given when a transaction is submitted.
c) Reduction of data client sends to Thing: Utilizing
CWT encoding instead of JWT reduces the size of tokens from
TABLE II
DELAY - ROPSTEN
Model Delay in secs (s) (95% conf. int.)
Hashes of auth. inform.-Fig. 1 53.2 (40.3, 66.1)
SC & 1 BC 64.4 (52.3, 77.1)
SC & 2 BCs-Fig. 2 57.8 (46.0, 69.7)
Dec-Auth 2-of-4 & 1 BC 76.7 (61.5, 92.0)
Dec-Auth 2-of-4 & 2 BCs-Fig. 3 49.1 (37.7, 60.5)
Dec-Auth 3-of-4 & 1 BC 77.5 (60.5, 94.6)
Dec-Auth 3-of-4 & 2 BCs-Fig. 3 52.2 (42.6, 61.7)
310 to 122 bytes. For the smart contract with one blockchain
model, the transaction cost is higher by approximately 17%
compared to the cost shown in Table I.
The proposed optimizations further reduce the amount of
data that the client needs to send to the Thing. For de-
centralized authorization with three ASes and without the
optimizations, the client sends 366 bytes (3 × 122 bytes) for
three tokens and 96 bytes (3×32 bytes) for three PoP keys, a
total of 462 bytes. With aggregate MACs, the client sends one
aggregate MAC instead of three, i.e. 64 bytes less, hence a total
of 398 bytes, which is a 13.9% reduction. The optimization
where common token fields are sent once results in 84 bytes
less, which is a 18.2% reduction, reducing the size to 314
bytes. The two optimizations together give a 32.0% reduction
of the number of bytes the client needs to send to the Thing.
The reduction for more ASes would be higher.
V. RELATED WORK
The work in [16] presents a blockchain-based decentralized
authorization system where authorization proofs can be ef-
ficiently verified. The work in [17] presents a decentralized
access control system where IoT devices are required to
interact directly with the blockchain and are assumed to be
always connected, while [18], [19] present solutions where
policies and access control decisions are directly recorded on
Bitcoin’s blockchain. The work in [20] present a system based
on OAuth 2.0 where a smart contract generates authorization
tokens, which a key server verifies in order to provide private
keys that allow clients to access a protected resource. The
work in [21] contains a high level description of using smart
contracts with OAuth 2.0 to provide an architecture where a
user can freely select the server to provide authorization for
the user’s protected resource. Finally, threshold signatures can
be used to achieve authorization from a subset of parties that
possess a share of a private signing key [22].
All the above works assume that the IoT devices interact
directly with the blockchain or are capable devices, i.e. they
are always connected to the Internet and are capable of im-
plementing public/private key cryptographic functions. We do
not make these assumptions, and propose a scheme where the
authorization function is distributed across multiple servers.
Our previous work [23] considered the case of a single AS
and a single chain, and proposed an approach to verify that
the IoT device and AS share a common secret.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Smart contracts can increase the functionality of a
blockchain, and transparently encode authorization policies
and logic. However, smart contracts are costly if executed on
a public blockchain. Interledger mechanisms enable the inter-
connection of multiple blockchains, hence allow moving smart
contract functionality to private or permissioned blockchains
with a lower execution cost. This paper has proposed such
models for decentralized authorization to constrained IoT
devices and quantified their performance in terms of reduced
transactions costs and delay, while also proposing mechanisms
to reduce the amount of data that needs to be sent to IoT
devices. We are currently investigating solutions for providing
more general services, such as tracking of assets in a supply
chain, in a decentralized manner over multiple ledgers.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Gerdes et al., “An architecture for authorization in constrained
environments,” IETF Draft, October 22, 2018.
[2] L. Seitz et al., “Use Cases for Authentication and Authorization in
Constrained Environments,” RFC 7744, IETF, January 2016.
[3] ——, “Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments
(ACE) using the OAuth 2.0 Framework (ACE-OAuth),” IETF Draft,
March 5, 2019.
[4] M. Jones, E. Wahlstroem, S. Erdtman, and H. Tschofenig, “CBOR Web
Token (CWT),” RFC 8392, Standards Track, IETF, May 2018.
[5] D. Hardt et al., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” RFC 6749,
Standards Track, IETF, October 2012.
[6] M. Jones, J. Bradley, and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Token (JWT),” RFC
7519, Standards Track, IETF, May 2015.
[7] ——, “JSON Web Signature (JWS),” RFC 7515, Standards Track, IETF,
May 2015.
[8] M. Sporny et al., “Verifiable Credentials Data Model 1.0: Expressing
verifiable information on the Web,” Draft Community Group Report,
W3C, March 12, 2019.
[9] J. Schaad, “CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE),” RFC 8152,
Standards Track, IETF, July 2017.
[10] Bitcoin Wiki, “Hashed Timelock Contracts (HTLC),”
https://en.bitcoinwiki.org/wiki/Hashed Timelock Contracts.
[11] ——, “Atomic cross-chain trading,”
https://en.bitcoinwiki.org/wiki/Atomic cross-chain trading.
[12] V. Buterin, “Chain Interoperability,” R3 Report, September 2016.
[13] J. Poon and T. Dryja, “The Bitcoin Lightning Network: Scalable
o-chain instant payments,” https://lightning.network/lightning-network-
paper.pdf, January 14, 2016, last accessed 24/02/2019.
[14] D. Reed et al., “Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v0.11: Data Model and
Syntaxes for Decentralized Identifiers,” Draft Community Group Report,
W3C, January 8, 2019.
[15] J. Katz and A. Y. Lindell, “Aggregate message authentication codes,” in
Proc. of The Cryptopgraphers’ Track at the RSA conference on Topics
in cryptology (CT-RSA), 2008.
[16] M. P. Andersen et al., “WAVE: A Decentralized Authorization System
for IoT via Blockchain Smart Contracts,” University of California at
Berkeley, Tech. Rep., December 2017.
[17] R. Xu et al., “BlendCAC: A BLockchain-ENabled Decentralized
Capability-based Access Control for IoTs,” arXiv:1804.09267v1, April
2018.
[18] D. D. F. Maesa, P. Mori, and L. Ricci, “Blockchain based access control,”
in Proc. of IFIP Distr. Appl. and Interop. Sys. (DAIS), 2017.
[19] Y. Zhang et al., “Smart Contract-Based Access Control for the Internet
of Things,” arXiv:1802.04410, February 2018.
[20] O. Alphand et al., “IoTChain: A blockchain security architecture for the
Internet of Things,” in Proc. of IEEE WCNC, 2018.
[21] T. Hardjono, “Decentralized Service Architecture for OAuth2.0,”
March 25, 2018. [Online]. Available: https://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-hardjono-oauth-decentralized-02
[22] A. Boldyreva, “Efficient threshold signature, multisignature and blind
signature schemes based on the Gap-Fife-Hellman-group signature
scheme,” IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, vol. 2002, p. 118, 2002.
[23] N. Fotiou, V. A. Siris, and G. C. Polyzos, “Interacting with the Internet
of Things using Smart Contracts and Blockchain Technologies,” in Proc.
of 7th Int’l Symp. on Security & Privacy on Internet of Things, in
conjunction with SpaCCS, 2018.
